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Abstract 
We consider the origins of global current account imbalances. We first discuss how the expansion of the U.S. 
current account deficit and the decrease in global real interest rates can be reconciled with the widespread view 
that American expansionary fiscal policy is partly the source of current trends. We then investigate empirically 
the medium-term determinants of the current account using a model that controls for factors related to 
institutional development. In addition to the conventional macroeconomic factors, we examine a series of 
environmental factors, including the degree of financial openness and the extent of legal development. We find 
that for industrial countries, the government budget balance is an important determinant of the current account 
balance; the budget balance coefficient is 0.10 to 0.49 depending on model specifications. These varying 
estimates lead us to conclude that fiscal factors might be as important as excess savings arising from East Asia. 
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1.  Introduction 
The enormous and rapidly widening U.S. current account deficit, displayed in Figure 1, has 
been the source of intense debate in academic and policy circles. The deficit-to-GDP ratio of 6.4 
percentage points recorded in the first three quarters of 2006 is high by historical standards, and 
high in comparison to other developed economies (Edwards, 2005).  
A number of explanations have been forwarded for the recent widening of the U.S. current 
account deficit. Roughly speaking, the arguments can be categorized as either domestic or 
international in nature. Some argue that the main reason for the increase in U.S. current account 
imbalances is the decline in U.S. savings, especially public sector savings, since 2002. In this “twin 
deficits” argument, the current administration’s expansionary fiscal policy bears the greatest blame. 
Greenspan (2005a,b), Ferguson (2004) and others have, on the other hand, argued that the impact of 
fiscal policy on the current account balance is small.  
The “global saving glut” explanation, most closely associated with Bernanke (2005), views 
excess saving from Asian emerging market countries, driven by rising savings and collapsing 
investment in the aftermath of the financial crisis, as the cause of the U.S. current account deficit 
(although the current account surpluses of the oil exporting countries have taken on a heightened 
prominence in recent years). From Bernanke’s perspective, the U.S. current account deficit is a 
caused by forces abroad, and amenable to a solution only in the longer term, as better developed 
financial systems mitigate this excess savings problem. Low real interest rates are consistent with 
this excess saving view. 
For two reasons, we believe that the Bernanke thesis demands closer examination, despite 
the surface appeal of the argument. First, in a counterpoint to his previous argument, Bernanke 
recently testified that one way to reduce the U.S. current account deficit is by increasing public 
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sector saving.1 Second, as shown in Figure 1, the current account deficit remains entrenched at 
about 6.4 percentage points despite the upward movement in real ten year interest rates.2  
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of current account balances for industrial and 
developing countries, while empirically controlling for differences in institutional environment 
across countries. The data set we employ covers a large and heterogeneous group of countries (19 
industrial, 69 developing) over a relatively long time span (1971-2004). Our empirical approach 
follows Chinn and Prasad (2003). Their study provided a broad empirical characterization of the 
medium-term determinants of current account balances for a sample of industrial and developing 
countries from the perspective of longer-run saving-investment balances.  
This paper updates and extends the work of Chinn and Prasad in several important respects. 
First, we focus on a potentially important factor identified by Bernanke (2005), namely the effect of 
financial development in the context of the legal system and institutions. Second, we allow for 
nonlinearities via interaction terms. Third, we analyze the determinants of the current account 
components, namely saving and investment.3 
Whether one takes the twin deficits or global saving glut argument, the effect of legal and 
institutional development cannot be dismissed a priori, although it clearly matters more in the latter 
case. In addition to macroeconomic attributes such as the stage of development, demographic 
profile, and the government budget balance, the legal environment and the level of institutional 
development should be important control variables. After all, the extent of private saving and 
                                                 
1 Lanman and Torres (2007). 
2 Ten year interest rates (constant maturity) minus the 10 year expected inflation rate as proxied by Blue Chip forecasts 
up to 1991q1, and by the Society of Professional Forecasters median forecasts thereafter. Inflation indexed yields over 
the past eight years are consistent with this pattern. 
3 Roughly contemporaneously with us, Gruber and Kamin (2005) have written a paper closely related to ours. 
However, they rely upon financial crises and country dummies to soak up variation in current account balances. Also, 
they do not include financial development and financial openness variables which are key to assessing the Bernanke 
conjecture. Moreover, they do not examine the dynamics of current account balances from the perspective of saving and 
investment determination as we do in this paper. 
 
 3
investment should depend upon how the returns from those activities are protected by these factors.  
The extent of institutional development should enhance the effectiveness of financial 
development and other policy measures such as financial opening. Hence, this paper also devotes 
special attention to the effect of financial development and examines whether the “financial 
deepening” argument (Edwards, 1996) or the saving glut argument is applicable for sample 
countries’ saving behavior. In this regard, we estimate a model that controls for financial deepening 
and interacts it with other variables such as institutional development and financial openness. The 
focus on financial development is also motivated by the argument that “the U.S. current account is 
…, in part, a reflection of a global excess of saving relative to profitable investment opportunities in 
the post-bubble world.” (Clarida, 2005a). 
The main findings are as follows. The budget balance is an important determinant of the 
current account balance for industrial countries; the coefficient for the budget balance variable is 
0.15 in a model controlling for institutional variables. A series of robustness checks yield the 
finding that a one percent point increase in the ratio of budget balance to GDP relative to the 
weighted world average should lead to a 0.10 to 0.49 percentage point increase in the current 
account to GDP ratio. We also find that institutional development is an important determinant for 
the current account balance mainly for higher income countries, although it is important for both 
saving and investment determination in all country groupings. More importantly, our empirical 
findings are not consistent with the argument that the more developed financial markets are, the less 
saving a country undertakes. Especially for most of the East Asian emerging market countries, we 
find that more financial development leads to higher saving. Furthermore, there is no evidence of 
East Asian “excess domestic saving”. Rather, countries of this region have experienced depressed 
investment during the post-crisis period. For the United States, our analysis confirms the view that it 
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is a saving drought – not investment boom – that is driving to the enlargement of the current 
account deficit, although there is some evidence of anomalous behaviour in the latest four year 
period.  
 
2. Competing Views on the Sources of the Global Imbalances 
  As noted above, several commentators have argued that the large current account surpluses 
in the rest of the world, specifically in East Asia, and more recently the oil exporting countries, are 
at the heart of the pattern of global imbalances. In this view, these current account surpluses have to 
be offset somewhere, and that somewhere is in the United States, largely because of the greater 
attractiveness of American assets. It is a line of reasoning that leads to the conclusion that the 
current account deficit will continue as long as the phenomenon of excess savings in the rest of the 
world persists. And, in one interpretation, the end could be years away. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, 
and Garber (2003, forthcoming) view the U.S. current account deficit as the outcome of concerted 
mercantilist efforts by East Asian state actors. In this context, the financing of America’s trade (and 
budget) deficit is an explicit quid pro quo for continued access to American markets.4 
 While the saving glut view has a seed of truth to it, particularly for the last couple of years 
or so, there are some problems with the story. First, the argument that fiscal policy cannot really 
have an impact on the current account deficit is subject to debate. Federal Reserve Board research 
indicating that one dollar’s worth of budget-deficit reduction will only induce a twenty-cent 
decrease in the trade deficit has been cited in support of this perspective;5 However, these results 
are based upon calibrated model simulations. The IMF’s calibrated model yields estimates closer to 
                                                 
4 Most problematic for this approach is the mysterious aspect of timing: East Asian savings began flowing to the United 
States in 2003. Why not earlier, if the mercantilist impetus had been there all along? (And why not devalue the renminbi 
in 1997?) For a thorough critique, see Prasad and Wei (2005).  
5 See Erceg et al. (2005). The effect of tax reductions arises from the rule-of-thumb consumers imbedded in a model 
otherwise characterized by Ricardian equivalence. 
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50 cents on the dollar (Faruqee, et al., 2005). Furthermore, it is important to realize that there is 
some disagreement on the econometrically measured size of the effect. The OECD’s 
macroeconometric model implies something around a forty-cent impact on the current account for 
each dollar’s worth of fiscal consolidation (OECD, 2005); this larger point estimate is not atypical 
of macroeconometric models. 
  Second, it is somewhat odd to think of the East Asian countries driving United States to 
consumption and saving behavior, especially when the U.S. economy is approximately three times 
the size of developing and industrializing East Asia. The conventional wisdom is more plausible: 
there is a saving scarcity in the United States, driven largely by the Federal budget deficit, and it is 
this saving drought in the United States that has been sucking in excess savings from the rest of the 
world for most of the past five years.  
  The strongest point in favor of the saving glut hypothesis is the observation of a widening 
current account deficit in the United States, combined with low real world interest rates. However, 
the saving glut versus twin deficits view is not an either-or proposition. Figure 2 depicts how it is 
possible for both motivations to coexist. Two regions are graphed – East Asia and the United States. 
The National Savings (NS) schedules are functions of fiscal policy, demographics, and the real 
interest rate. The Investment schedules (I) are functions of the interest rate and many other factors. 
In this model, the real interest rate is assumed to be equalized, such that international capital 
markets would clear, i.e., the current account imbalances between the two economies balance out 
each other.6  
                                                 
6 In practice, the real interest rate is not necessarily equalized; capital controls, risk premia and expected real 
depreciation would be expected to drive a wedge between real rates of different countries. 
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 In period 0, the world interest rate is r0, and the U.S. runs a current account deficit, while 
East Asia runs a corresponding current account surplus.7 In period 1, the U.S. undertakes an 
expansionary fiscal policy that pulls in the NS schedule. At the same time, the investment schedule 
shifts inward in East Asia (e.g., as a result of a financial crisis). This confluence of events drives 
down the real world interest rate to r1. Thus, using a simple open macro model, we can explain the 
recent rise in U.S. current account deficits, East Asian current account surpluses, and the recent fall 
in global interest rates by both deficit spending by the U.S. and investment draught in East Asia. 
However, also note that the in the absence of a change in fiscal policy, the U.S. current account 
imbalance would have been much smaller.  
 In other words, as macroeconomics has moved beyond simple bivariate analyses, so more 
sophisticated assessments are necessary. We seek to inform the debate by measuring the 
relationship between fiscal variables and current account balance, conditioning on a series of other 
variables we think are of importance. 
 
3.  Measuring the Fiscal Effect 
3.1 Specification 
 We base the choice of macroeconomic variables for this exercise on the discussion in 
Chinn and Prasad (2003).   
tttttt ZXnfabusgdpcagdp εβββ +Ξ+Γ+++= −1210  
where CAGDP is the current account balance to GDP ratio, BUSGDP is the budget surplus to GDP 
                                                 
7 The “world” in this model can be considered as one small closed economy composed of two large open economies, 
East Asia and the U.S. Hence, the world real interest rate (R) is the real interest rate that equilibrates cross-border 
lending and borrowing between the two economies such that the world current account will be in balance. In this model, 
when shocks arise as they do in the text, the world real interest rate would vary so as to keep the absolute values of the 
current account balances of the two economies equal to each other. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
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ratio, NFA is net foreign assets to GDP ratio, and X includes a set of structural and other 
macroeconomic variables, and Z includes institutional and policy factors.  
We deal with the two key variables and the macro variables first. A variety of models 
predict a positive relationship between government budget balances (BUSGDP) and current 
accounts over the medium term. In the absence of a full Ricardian offset via private saving, an 
increase in the government budget balance could lead to an increase in national saving. In 
developing economies, where a greater proportion of agents may be liquidity constrained, this 
relationship might be expected to be more pronounced.  
 From an intertemporal perspective, the stock of net foreign assets (NFA) serves as an 
important initial condition, given that the current account is the sum of the trade balance and the 
return on a country’s stock of NFA (or payment on its net foreign liabilities position). Alternatively, 
from a buffer stock savings perspective, higher levels of initial net foreign assets should be 
associated with subsequent lower current account balances. 
Among the macroeconomic variables (included in X), we include the variable for relative 
income levels (to the U.S.; RELY) and their square terms in the model specification. The “stages of 
development” hypothesis for the balance of payments suggests that countries, as they move from a 
low to an intermediate stage of development, typically import capital and, therefore, run current 
account deficits. As they reach an advanced stage of development, countries run current account 
surpluses in order to pay off accumulated external liabilities and also to export capital to less 
advanced economies.  
 The literature on the determinants of national saving has pointed to a number of additional 
“structural” determinants such as demographics (YOUNG and OLD). Masson et al. (1998) show that 
the dependency ratio is one of the key determinants of private saving. Terms of trade volatility 
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(TOTSD) is another potential determinant of medium-term fluctuations in current accounts. Agents 
in economies that face more volatile terms of trade might save more for precautionary reasons in 
order to smooth their consumption streams in the face of volatile income flows. The degree of 
openness to international trade (OPEN) is also included since it could reflect policy choices, 
including tariff regimes.8  
These macro data are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the World Economic Outlook database. For the 
measure of net foreign asset, we use the data created by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Additional 
details are contained in the Data Appendix. 
One of the innovations in this study is that we focus on potential effects of other factors than 
conventional macroeconomic variables on the saving and investment determination. These factors 
are specifically financial development/deepening, financial (capital account) openness, and 
legal/institutional development, all of which are included in Z in the above specification.   
“Financial development” or “financial deepening” is often identified as a determinant for 
saving and investment. While the effect of financial development on investment is unambiguous 
(i.e., positive), that on saving is not, because higher returns and lower risk of financial investment 
create effects on saving akin to income and substitution effects. The traditional interpretation of this 
variable as a measure of the depth and sophistication of the financial system suggests that financial 
deepening could induce more saving, although a contrasting view holds that more developed 
financial markets might lessen the need for precautionary saving, and thus have an opposite effect. 
Bernanke (2005) argues that greater financial development will remedy the global saving glut in the 
long run by inducing a decline in the savings rate in the emerging Asia. Relatedly, Clarida (2005a,b) 
                                                 
8 Five-year averages of real GDP (YGRAVG) are also included to account for changes in productivity levels. 
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argues that the sophisticated equity markets in the U.S. absorb excess saving from all over the 
world, leading to higher current account deficits. To measure financial development, we use private 
credit to GDP (PCGDP).9 The PCGDP data are drawn from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine 
(2001 and subsequent updates). 
 How open a country is for cross-border financial transactions should also affect capital 
flows across countries, and thus the current account. According to the global saving glut view, 
comprehensive financial liberalization policies in East Asia have allowed excess saving to flow into 
the U.S, and other countries with developed financial markets. Our metric of financial openness is 
the Chinn-Ito (2005) index (KAOPEN). This index is based upon the IMF’s categorical enumeration 
pertaining to cross-border financial transactions reported in Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Higher values of this index indicate greater 
financial openness.10  
 A society’s legal foundations and institutions define the context wherein financial 
transactions and economic decisions are made. As the expanding literature on finance and growth 
has emphasized, a society’s legal foundations and institutions define the context wherein financial 
transactions and economic decisions are made. Levine, et al. (2000) find that the cross-country 
differences in legal and regulatory systems influence the development of the financial 
intermediary.11 Consequently the effect of legal and institutional development can have 
implications along any number of dimensions.  
We incorporate the effect of legal and institutional development by inclusion of the 
                                                 
9 One may think of equity market development and its measures. Due to difficulties in distinguishing between market 
bubbles and true market development, we rely upon this traditional measure. 
10 The data are updated to 2004 and cover more countries (163 countries) than what can be found in Chinn and Ito 
(2006). The updated data are available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/.   
11 For the analysis of legal development on financial development, see Beck and Levine (2004) and Johnson, et al. 
(2002) among others. 
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variable LEGAL, calculated as the first principal component of law and order (LAO), corruption 
(CORRUPT), and bureaucracy quality (BQ).12 The data series are available for the period of 1984 
through 2004, but are included in the regression as the period-average.13 
 
3.2 Estimating the Basic Model 
The sample for our analysis covers both industrial and developing countries. The underlying 
database has annual data for 19 industrial and 69 developing countries covering the period 
1971-2004. We examine three variables – the current account balance, and its constituents, national 
saving, and investment, all expressed as a ratio to GDP.  
One potential problem with developing country data is the possibility of significant 
measurement error in annual data. To mitigate these concerns, and to focus our interest in 
medium-term rather than short-term variations in current accounts, we construct a panel that 
contains non-overlapping 5-year averages of the data for each country.14 Furthermore, all the 
variables, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are converted into the deviations from their 
GDP-weighted world mean prior to the calculation of five year averages. The use of demeaned 
series controls for rest-of-world effects. In other words, a country’s current account balance is 
determined by developments at home as well as abroad.   
Because the economic environment may affect the way in which financial development 
might affect saving and investment we include interaction terms involving these variables. 
Interactions between the financial development and legal variables (PCGDP times LEGAL), 
                                                 
12 Higher values indicate better conditions. The choice of these variables is motivated by the literature on the finance 
and growth, as well as the wide coverage afforded by their use.  
13 In other words, the data on legal/institutional development are cross-sectional in nature, i.e., they are time-invariant. 
This is primarily due to data availability. The relative shortness of the time series of the ICRG variables makes it 
difficult to include these variables as panel data.  
14 The 2001-04 period has been compressed into one observation, and so represents only 4 years instead of the standard 
5. 
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interactions between the financial development and financial openness variables (PCGDP times 
KAOPEN), and interactions between legal development and financial openness (LEGAL times 
KAOPEN). The financial and legal interaction effect is motivated by the conjecture that deepening 
financial markets might lead to higher saving rates, but the effect might be magnified under 
conditions of better developed legal institutions. Alternatively, if greater financial deepening leads 
to a lower saving rate or a lower investment rate, that effect could be mitigated when financial 
markets are equipped with highly developed legal systems. A similar argument can be applied to the 
effect of financial openness on current account balances.  
We begin our investigation with a basic specification that excludes institutional variables. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 1.15 One interesting result shown in the table is the 
significantly positive relationship between current account and government budget balances found 
for the industrialized countries group.16 This result differs from the results obtained in Chinn and 
Prasad (2003), who examined a shorter sample from 1971 to 1995. A one percentage point increase 
in the budget balance would lead to a 0.16 percentage point increase in the current account balance 
for industrialized countries and 0.24 for less developed countries except for African countries. 
While significant, this is substantially less than the estimate obtained by Chinn and Prasad. We 
attribute this result partly to the differing sample (the estimate is also lower in the 1971-1995 
sample), but also to the difference in behavior of current account balances in recent years. 
One more noteworthy aspect of Table 1 relates to the financial deepening variable. Only in 
the industrial countries’ current account regressions does it exhibit a negative coefficient, though 
statistically insignificantly. With these results, one may not be able to conclude that more developed 
                                                 
15 Since these results are sensitive to the inclusion of the African countries, we also report separate sets of results with 
and without the African countries included, for the developing country sample. We also report separate results for an 
emerging market group that differs somewhat from the developing country sample. 
16 For the remainder of the paper, statistical significance denotes a p-value less than 10%. 
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financial markets lead to decreased current account balances, as posited by the adherents of the 
global saving glut thesis.17 
As we discussed in a previous section, we also suspect that the omission of other factors 
such as institutional infrastructure and legal systems may have induced omitted variable bias. As a 
first step toward addressing this issue, we re-estimated the regressions including country and time 
fixed effects and dropping those regressors that, by construction, have no time variation – terms of 
trade volatility and the openness indicator. Once the fixed effects model is estimated, the null 
hypothesis that country fixed effects are joint zero is rejected for all three models and subsamples at 
conventional levels of significance.18  
In this exercise, the most interesting result is the finding that the coefficient on the 
government surplus rises to 0.38, and is significant at the 1% marginal significance level. From the 
national saving and investment regressions (not reported), the positive impact of budget balances on 
current account balances is detected only in industrial and emerging market countries, and comes 
mainly from an improvement in the level of national saving.  
 
3.3 The Implications of Institutional Development 
Given that fixed effects are difficult to interpret in an economically meaningful way, we return 
to the pooled OLS specification, but augment our basic model specification with variables aimed at 
capturing institutional factors, namely the legal development variable (LEGAL), financial openness 
                                                 
17 In the saving regressions (not reported), all the sample groups except for the industrial country group have 
significantly positive coefficients for the financial deepening variable. This issue will be examined more carefully in a 
later section. 
18 We also conducted the Hausman test for all regressions and subsamples to examine whether the distribution of the 
error terms can be systematically explained by country-specific characteristics. A series of tests indicate that the random 
effects specification is rejected in favor of the fixed effects for all sample groups except for the developed countries 
(IDC) and emerging market countries (EMG) groups among the current account regressions; for all except for the IDC 
group (marginally rejected) among the national saving regressions; and for the full sample and the less developed 
countries group (LDC) among the investment regressions. 
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(KAOPEN), and associated interaction terms (including those with PCGDP). Table 2 displays 
results from panel OLS regressions with institutional variables. We obtain several notable results. 
First, despite inclusion of institutional variables and their interactions, the significantly 
positive relationship between current account and government budget balances is detected in almost 
all sample groups like in Table 1 from the previous analysis. The point estimate on budget balances 
is a statistically significant 0.15 for the industrialized countries group, about the same as in the 
previous estimation, implying that the coefficient on the budget balance for the IDC group is robust 
to inclusion of institutional variables (Note that a ±2 standard error confidence interval encompasses 
values as high as 0.34). The estimated coefficients on budget balances remain close to what we 
found in Table 1 the other sample groups.19  
Using a smaller sample of 71 countries over the 1982-2003 period, Gruber and Kamin 
(2005), find that the budget balance has a positive effect on the current account, with a magnitude of 
0.09-0.14. Trade openness also exhibits a similar effect as in our estimates. Perhaps most 
importantly, they also find that higher values of their governance indicator (the Kaufmann et al. 
measure) induce a reduction in the current account balance.20 These findings suggest that several of 
the key effects we have detected are robust. 
Second, different components of the institutional variable have different effects. We 
re-estimate the same regressions using each of the components of the LEGAL variable -- 
CORRUPT, BQ, and LAO – in order to isolate which variable drives the results. The test results (not 
                                                 
19 We retain variables with insignificant coefficient estimates in the models for the sake of compatibility with other 
subsample groups and with models with other dependent variables, national saving and investment (not reported for 
space concerns). We find that the main results are robust to their exclusion, and generally will strengthen the 
significance of marginally significant estimates.  
20 In their analysis, they include the change in growth rate, as well as dummy variables for financial (i.e., banking) 
crises. On the other hand, they omit measures of capital account openness, financial development as well as terms of 
trade variability. They also exclude interaction effects involving legal development, thus ruling out nonlinearities of this 
type.  
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reported) suggest that the inverse corruption index is found to enter the estimation most 
significantly among the three institutions variables, followed by law and order and the bureaucracy 
quality index in the order of significance. When the inverse-corruption index is used, the estimated 
coefficient on the budget balance for the industrial countries group becomes as high as 0.24. Also, 
the estimated coefficient on the inverse-corruption index is insignificantly negative for the IDC 
group and significantly negative for the LDC and ex-Africa LCD groups, suggesting that countries 
with lower degrees of corruption may experience capital inflows (see e.g., Wei, 2000).21  
Third, financial development has different, and nonlinear, effects on saving and investment. 
Since the financial development variable (PCGDP) is interacted with other institutional variables 
(LEGAL and KAOPEN), however, we must be careful about interpretation of the effect of financial 
development. In Table 3, we examine the nonlinearities implicit in our estimates from Table 2. Each 
of the sub-tables displays the implied response coefficients for differing levels of financial 
development and capital account openness. Table 3 shows the total effect of a 10% point increase in 
the relative PCGDP conditional on the levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN (the latter as of the 
1996-2004 period) – whether their levels are low 10 percentile, mean, or high 10 percentile in each 
subsample, IDC, LDC, and EMG (Panels A, B, and C, respectively).22 
Panel D of Table 3 categorizes emerging market countries in East Asia depending on the 
                                                 
21 We also tested the models using the time varying institutional variables (i.e., five-year averages of LEGAL and other 
component variables instead of the cross-sectional variables). Although we find qualitatively similar results, we also 
find less significant results for the estimates on the legal variables and their interactions. This finding is not surprising 
considering that these institutional variables vary much less widely over time than across the countries. We also tested 
using the five-year averages of the Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney and Lawson, 2006. This is a 
composite index composed of five subcategories for the size of government; legal structure and intellectual property 
rights protection; sound monetary management; freer trade; and domestic regulations on credit, labor, and business. We 
found relatively significant results compared to those with the five-year averages of the LEGAL variable. However, it 
appears that the results are rather driven by components of the index that are not directly related to legal or institutional 
development. 
22 Between the 1991-95 and 2001-04 time periods, the (five-year average of relative) PCGDP level – the level of 
financial deepening above or below the weighted world average – increased by 20.6 percentage points for industrialized 
countries, 3.7 percentage points for less developed countries, 8.2 percentage points for Asian emerging market 
countries, and stunning 32.4 percentage points for China. 
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level of legal development and financial openness. The matrix shows that only Hong Kong and 
Singapore are categorized as countries with highest tenth percentile legal development and highest 
tenth percentile financial openness, while many Asian emerging market countries are categorized in 
the groups with the middle or lower level of legal development and financial openness, and hence 
likely to exhibit close to zero responsiveness of the current account.23 Figure 3 reports the total 
effects of a 10 percentage point increase in PCGDP on current account, national savings, and 
investment for Asian emerging market countries, using specific values for each country’s legal 
development and financial openness measures.24,25 The chart indicates that Hong Kong and 
Singapore are the only countries for which financial development will cause a negative impact on 
national savings. Other countries will experience an increase in the ratio of national savings to GDP 
if financial markets develop further. Interestingly, for all the countries, financial development leads 
to expansion of investment, presumably because of improved credit conditions and financial 
intermediation. Furthermore, in terms of the effect on net saving, only Hong Kong and Singapore 
will experience a substantial deterioration in net savings as a result of further financial deepening 
because the magnitude of the effect on investment exceeds that on national savings. In the case of 
Singapore, the current account deteriorates by almost a percentage point in response to a ten 
                                                 
23 It must be noted that most of these Asian emerging market countries comprise top 15 foreign reserves holding 
countries as of 2004. 
24 For the effects on national saving and investment, we use the estimation results from the regressions that are run 
using the same set of regressors. To conserve space, we do not report the results. They are available from the authors 
upon request. 
25 The estimated effects on the national saving and investment regressions do not strictly add up to that on the current 
account regressions. At least two reasons can be identified for this outcome. First, while the current account regressions 
account for the covariance of national savings and investment, simply adding two coefficients does not. That is, if some 
change in the level of financial development (conditional on financial openness and institutional development) affects 
national saving and investment independently, as long as the changes in national saving and investment do not affect 
each other, the total effect would be the same as that on current account balances. However, if national saving and 
investment are highly correlated, as has been found in many studies such as Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Frankel 
et al. (1987), simply adding two coefficients does not yield the coefficient in the current account regression. Second, 
due to differing data conventions (Balance of Payments accounting versus national income accounting definition), the 
flows may not add up exactly. 
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percentage point increase in the private credit to GDP ratio. The effect in Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand is much more muted, while the China effect is essentially zero.  
The Chinese case merits some discussion. China experienced a remarkable 32.4 percentage 
point increase in private credit creation (net of change in the world weighted average). This 
financial development alone implied a national savings increase of 1.7 percentage points, but also 
an investment increase of 2.4 percentage points, suggesting a negative effect of financial 
development on net saving; the directly estimated zero net effect on the current account reflects the 
uncertainty surrounding these point estimates.  
In sum, these results present evidence against part of the argument that emerging market 
countries, especially those in East Asia, will experience lower rates of saving once these countries 
achieve higher levels of financial development and better developed legal infrastructure. More open 
financial markets do not appear to have any impact on current account balances for this group of 
countries, either. If anything, arguments based upon this thesis have inappropriately extended a 
characterization applicable to industrialized countries to less developed countries. 
Figure 4 reports how well our models predict current account balances in key economies. 
The actual current account series for these countries fall in the 95 confidence intervals, though the 
U.S. seems to be falling out of the interval. However, Figure 5, that shows out-of-sample 
predictions for the 1995-2000 and 2001-04 periods using the estimated coefficients from the 
regressions – with and without institutional variables – implemented over the 1971-95 time periods, 
illustrates that recent development in current imbalances were somewhat unexpected for the U.S. 
and Asian countries. Figure 6 shows prediction errors for the 2000-04 period from the estimations 
with and without institutional variables. The extent of over-prediction and under-prediction is large 
for the U.S. and China or ex-China Asian emerging countries, respectively. 
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Last, let us examine what has contributed to the unexpected changes in current account 
balances for the U.S. and emerging East Asia. The framework we rely upon allows us to examine 
the determinants of current account balances from the perspective of saving-investment balances. 
Figure 7-1 shows the out-of-sample predictions for U.S. national saving and investment using the 
estimation model with the institutional variables, and Figure 7-2 shows those for emerging East 
Asia excluding China. The figures for U.S. national saving and investment show that while the U.S. 
current account deficit is driven by more-than-expected performance in investment in the 
1996-2000 period, in contrast the deficit during the 2001-04 period is driven by a “saving drought,” 
rather than “investment boom.” Interestingly, however, the under-prediction of Asian emerging 
market group ex-China current account balances is a result of the collapse of investment in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis.26,27 These observations are consistent with the situation depicted in 
Figure 2. In sum, we have shown that, from the perspective of the data up to 1995, the 
larger-than-predicted current account balance East Asia is running is more consistent with an 
unexpected fall in investment than with the “excess saving” in the region while the current account 
imbalance for the U.S. is more consistent with a saving drought than with an investment boom. 
 
3.4 Robustness Checks 
In our framework, simultaneity is of concern. In particular, government budget balances 
could involve bi-directional causality with the dependent variables. Furthermore, the budget balance 
                                                 
26 The resulting conclusion that East Asia is undergoing an investment drought is consistent with the findings of 
Higgins (2005). 
27 When the same exercise is conducted for China, we find (not reported) that, since the 1991-95 period, the country 
has run much better current account balances than the model predicts, and that the under-prediction of the country’s 
current balances is driven by excess saving. More specifically, both national saving and investment are larger than 
model predictions, with the extent of the former larger than the latter. Despite these findings, Although we find evidence 
of excess saving for China, we are unsure of the reliability of the estimates the uncertainty surrounding the country’s 
saving data. For example, GDP was revised upward by 16.8% upward at the beginning of 2006. 
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variable and other right-hand-side variables may be subject to business cycles effects despite our 
use of time-averaged data. 
Here, we examine the robustness of the estimated coefficient on the budget balance in 
several ways. First, we implement two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, instrumenting the 
budget balance variable with several candidate variables. The instruments we try include a dummy 
for the left-wing government (LEFT); political constraint (democracy) index (POLCONV); military 
spending as a ratio to GDP (MILEXP); yearly changes in unemployment rates (D_U); and regional 
dummies.28  
The estimation results are shown in Table 4, in which we only show estimated coefficients 
on budget balances for different model specifications and different dependent variables. Rows (1) 
and (2) show the results from the 2SLS estimation with and without institutional variables. When 
compared to the results in Table 2, we can see that, for industrialized countries, the estimated 
coefficients are consistently significant and their magnitudes are higher than those in the previous 
analysis.29  
Second, we re-estimate with data sampled at an annual frequency, but use HP-detrended 
                                                 
28 The choice of these instruments is based on past findings in the literature on the determinants of budget balances 
such as Roubini (1991), Roubini and Sachs (1989a, b), Persson and Tabellini (2001), and Braconier and Holden (2004). 
The military spending ratio is not included as an instrument in the regressions for industrial countries because it turned 
out to be insignificant in the first stage regression. The interaction between the left-wing government dummy and the 
change the unemployment rate is included in the IDC regressions to capture the left-wing government’s reaction to 
change in the unemployment rate. In the LDC and EMG regressions, on the other hand, while the military spending 
variable is included, neither the unemployment rate change variable nor its interaction with the left-wing government 
dummy is included due to their statistical insignificance. The definitions and sources of the instruments can be found in 
Data Appendix. In addition to the variables mentioned in the text, we also tested the dummy for countries with plural 
political systems; government fragmentation (both from DPI 2004); political constraint, or democracy, index (from 
Henisz, 2000); and the standard deviation of tax revenues (following Talvi and Vegh, 2005). These variables turned out 
to be insignificant, and were thereby not included as instruments. We also conduct routine statistical tests on the 
relevance of instruments such as Anderson’s (1984) canonical correlations and Cragg-Donald (1993) weak 
identification tests as well as those on over-identification of instruments using Sargan (1958) J statistic (for the 2SLS 
with heteroskedasticity standard errors).  
29 For the 2SLS regressions with statistically significant coefficients on budget balances, both the Anderson canonical 
correlation statistic and the Cragg-Donald statistic significantly reject the null hypothesis of under-identification of the 
instruments. Furthermore, the Sargan J test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the orthogonality conditions. Other 
results of the first stage regressions are available from the authors upon request. 
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series for the variables that exhibit business cycles variation – namely, the budget balance, net 
foreign asset, relative income, output growth, and financial deepening (PCGDP). While sampling 
five-year period averages should mitigate the effect of business cycles, that method may not be 
sufficient to completely remove business cycle effects. We apply pooled OLS and the fixed effects 
specification to obtain the results displayed in rows (3) and (4) of Table 4, respectively. In order to 
account for the possibility of serial correlation, we also estimate the model using feasible GLS. 
Those results, without and with institutional variables and interactions, are reported in rows (5) and 
(6), respectively. 
The magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients across different 
subsamples and the three sets of regressions are quite consistent with what we have found in the 
previous subsections. The congruence with previous results is more evident for the industrial 
country group. A one percent point increase in the budget balance leads to between a 10 and 49% 
point increase in the current account balances, and between a 17 and 81% point increase in national 
saving. With these results, we can safely conclude that an increase in the government budget 
balance does improve the current account balance in industrialized countries, and that effect is 
mainly achieved through an improvement in national saving.30  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have investigated the medium-term determinants of the current account 
using a model that controls for institutional factors such as financial openness and legal 
development, in order to inform the recent debate over the source of and solution to the “global 
                                                 
30 The results of other variables of our focus, namely financial deepening, financial opening, institutional development, 
and these interactions, turned out to be qualitatively consistent, but more statistically significant compared to those in 
previous analyses. For IDC countries particularly, financial deepening and financial openness appear to contribute 
negatively to current account balances and national savings. 
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saving glut” that has thus far lacked empirical content. We focused our study on the behavior of 
current accounts for the United States and emerging market countries in East Asia. 
We find that in an industrial country, a one percentage point increase in the budget 
balance-GDP ratio raises the current account balance by 0.15-16 percentage point. While smaller 
than the coefficient implied by some macro models, the standard errors on the point estimate are 
sufficiently large so that one cannot rule out a coefficient as high as 0.34 at conventional 
significance levels. Alternative specifications suggest that a one percent point increase in the budget 
balance should lead to between a 0.10 and 0.49 percentage point increase in the ratio of the current 
account balance to GDP ratio. We also found evidence for a similar relationship for non-IDC 
countries. These findings are robust to inclusion of institutional variables, although incorporating 
financial factors seems to matter more (in a statistical sense) for industrialized countries than for 
less developed countries. Furthermore, we found evidence that the oft-cited effects of financial and 
legal development are only applicable to industrial countries. Consequently, policy 
recommendations made by the adherents of the global saving glut view have only tenuous empirical 
basis insofar as they relate to East Asia.  
Finally, we have determined that saving per se is not excessive among the East Asian 
emerging market countries. Rather, these countries have experienced a shortfall in investment. The 
United States, on the other hand, is experiencing saving drought, driven in part by public sector 
dissaving.
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Data Appendix 
The data used in this paper were drawn from a number of different sources. We provide below a listing of 
the mnemonics for the variables used in the analysis, descriptions of these variables and the source(s) 
from which the primary data for constructing these variables were taken. A listing of the countries in the 
final sample, along with the country groupings used in the analysis, is provided in the working paper 
version of this paper. For most countries, data were available from 1971 through 2004.  
  
Mnemonic Source* Variable description 
CAGDP WDI Current account to GDP ratio 
NSGDP WDI National saving to GDP ratio 
KFGDP WDI Capital formation to GDP ratio 
BUSGDP WDI, IFS General government budget balance, ratio to GDP 
NFA LM Stock of net foreign assets, ratio to GDP 
RELY  WDI Relative per capita income, adjusted by PPP exchange rates, 
measured relative to the U.S., range (0 to 1) 
YOUNG WDI Youth dependency ratio (relative to mean across all countries), 
Population under 15 / Population between 15 and 65 
OLD  WDI Old dependency ratio (relative to mean across all countries), 
Population over 65 / Population between 15 and 65 
YGRAVG WDI Average real GDP growth 
TOTSD WDI Standard deviation of terms of trade 
OPEN  WDI Openness indicator: ratio of exports plus imports of goods and 
nonfactor services to GDP 
PCGDP BDL Banking development, ratio of private credit to GDP 
KAOPEN** CI Capital account openness 
BQ ICRG Quality of Bureaucracy 
LAO ICRG Law and order 
CORRUPT ICRG Corruption index 
LEGAL**  Authors’ calculations General level of legal development, first principal component of 
BQ, LAO, and CORRUPT. 
LEFT DPI2004 Dummy for left-wing government  
PLURAL DPI2004 Dummy for countries with plural political systems 
MILEXP SIPRI Defense spending (as a ratio to GDP) 
POLCONV Henisz Political Constraint (democracy) Index 
POLITY Polity IV Polity (democracy) score  
U WDI Unemployment rate 
  
* These are mnemonics for the sources used to construct the corresponding. BDL: Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, 
and Levine (2001, updated in following years); CI: Chinn and Ito (2006); DPI2004: Database of Political 
Institutions, Beck et al. (2001 and updated); GM: Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (1998); Henisz: Henisz 
(2000); ICRG: International Country Risk Guide; IFS: IMF’s International Financial Statistics; IMF: 
Other IMF databases; LM: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006); Polity IV: Polity IV project (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2002, updated in 2004); SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (personal 
correspondence), and WDI: World Development Indicators (2006). 
** In the original series, KAOPEN and LEGAL series range between negative and positive values since 
they are the first principal components. However, in order to avoid the complexity of interpreting the 
estimated coefficients, these variables are adjusted such that the minimum value is zero, i.e., they range 
between zero and some positive value.
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Table 1: Current account regression without institutions variable 
Dependent variable: 5-yr average of current account (% of GDP): 1971 – 2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full IDC LDC LDC w/o Africa EMG 
Gov’t budget balance 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.242 0.219 
 [0.068]** [0.086]* [0.081]* [0.092]*** [0.076]*** 
Lane’s NFA (initial) 0.049 0.063 0.047 0.05 0.043 
 [0.005]*** [0.011]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.009]*** 
Relative income 0.027 0.059 0.032 0.09 0.1 
 [0.019] [0.025]** [0.085] [0.090] [0.082] 
Relative income squared 0.016 -0.212 0.008 0.118 0.073 
 [0.029] [0.080]*** [0.096] [0.105] [0.092] 
Rel. dependency ratio (young) -0.06 0.021 -0.071 -0.075 -0.013 
 [0.020]*** [0.073] [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.022] 
Rel. dependency ratio (old) -0.205 0.001 -0.313 -0.241 -0.347 
 [0.061]*** [0.081] [0.093]*** [0.098]** [0.106]*** 
Financial deepening (PCGDP) 0.001 -0.006 0.005 0.013 0.003 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] 
TOT volatility -0.013 0.063 -0.017 -0.006 -0.016 
 [0.019] [0.058] [0.020] [0.018] [0.019] 
Avg. GDP growth -0.151 -0.101 -0.161 -0.145 -0.187 
 [0.141] [0.207] [0.155] [0.117] [0.115] 
Trade openness 0.003 0.037 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 
 [0.009] [0.011]*** [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] 
Oil exporting countries 0.046 – 0.047 0.039 0.028 
 [0.013]*** – [0.013]*** [0.011]*** [0.013]** 
Observations 502 132 370 235 210 
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.50 0.39 0.53 0.49 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The estimated coefficients for the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown. 
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Table 2: Current account regression with legal development (LEGAL) 
Dependent variable: 5-yr average of current account (% of GDP): 1971 – 2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full IDC LDC 
LDC w/o 
Africa EMG 
Gov’t budget balance 0.159 0.154 0.168 0.251 0.23 
 [0.065]** [0.095]* [0.079]** [0.091]*** [0.075]*** 
Lane's NFA (initial) 0.049 0.069 0.047 0.051 0.041 
 [0.005]*** [0.011]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.009]*** 
Relative income 0.062 0.058 0.115 0.16 0.216 
 [0.028]** [0.028]** [0.096] [0.106] [0.103]** 
Relative income squared 0.032 -0.097 0.057 0.157 0.166 
 [0.038] [0.120] [0.102] [0.121] [0.111] 
Rel. dependency ratio (young) -0.061 -0.027 -0.076 -0.099 -0.044 
 [0.018]*** [0.082] [0.022]*** [0.030]*** [0.023]* 
Rel. dependency ratio (old) -0.2 0.099 -0.368 -0.331 -0.529 
 [0.058]*** [0.098] [0.096]*** [0.114]*** [0.127]*** 
Financial Develop. (PCGDP) -0.008 0.01 -0.043 -0.038 -0.082 
 [0.009] [0.012] [0.032] [0.040] [0.038]** 
Legal development (LEGAL) -0.003 0.002 -0.017 -0.02 -0.018 
 [0.004] [0.007] [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.010]* 
PCGDP x LEGAL -0.003 -0.035 -0.021 -0.025 -0.037 
 [0.004] [0.015]** [0.011]* [0.012]** [0.016]** 
Financial open. (KAOPEN) -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.008 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010] 
KAOPEN x LEGAL 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.005 
 [0.001]* [0.003]*** [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
KAOPEN x PCGDP -0.003 0.002 0 0.002 -0.002 
 [0.005] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] 
TOT volatility -0.013 0.1 -0.015 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.017] [0.054]* [0.018] [0.019] [0.022] 
Avg. GDP growth -0.123 -0.036 -0.09 -0.107 -0.132 
 [0.087] [0.243] [0.096] [0.124] [0.118] 
Trade openness 0.006 0.046 0.005 0 0.004 
 [0.009] [0.014]*** [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] 
Oil exporting countries 0.041 – 0.04 0.035 0.025 
 [0.013]*** – [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]* 
Observations 471 126 345 234 203 
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.55 0.46 0.54 0.51 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The estimated coefficients for the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown. 
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Table 3: Total Effects on Current Account of a 10% increase in Financial Development  
conditional on legal development and financial openness 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.38] 
A: Industrialized countries Low 
10 percentile 
(3.55) 
Mean 
(4.22) 
High 
10 percentile 
(4.38) 
Low 
10 percentile (4.37) 0.365 0.379 0.382 
Mean 
(5.69) -0.095 -0.082 -0.079 
LEGAL 
[0, 6.51] 
High 
10 percentile (6.47) -0.370 -0.357 -0.354 
 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.38] 
B: Less developed countries Low  
10 percentile 
(0.66) 
Mean  
(1.82) 
High  
10 percentile  
(4.08) 
Low 
10 percentile (1.15) 0.408 0.408 0.408 
Mean  
(2.48) 0.127 0.127 0.127 
LEGAL 
[0, 6.51] 
High 
10 percentile (3.89) -0.167 -0.167 -0.167 
 
 
KAOPEN [0, 4.38] 
C: Emerging market 
countries 
Low  
10 percentile 
(0.66) 
Mean  
(1.90) 
High  
10 percentile  
(3.96) 
Low 
10 percentile (1.66) 0.528 0.503 0.462 
Mean  
(2.96) 0.058 0.033 -0.008 
LEGAL 
[0, 6.51] 
High 
10 percentile (4.50) -0.523 -0.548 -0.589 
 
 
KAOPEN 
D: Matrix for  
Emerging Asia 
Low  
10 percentile 
(0.66) 
Mean  
(1.90) 
High  
10 percentile 
(3.96) 
Low 
10 percentile 
(1.66) 
Bangladesh 
Indonesia, 
Philippines, 
Sri Lanka 
 
Mean  
(2.93) China 
India, Korea, 
Malaysia, 
Thailand,  
ex-China EA
 LEGAL 
High 
10 percentile 
(4.50) 
 
 
 
 
Hong Kong, 
Singapore 
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Table 4: Estimated coefficients on the government budget balance  
on current account balance (% of GDP) in different model specifications 
 
Model Specifications IDC LDC EMG 
    
(0) pooled OLS w/ inst. vars 0.154 0.168 0.230 
(1) 2SLS – IV w/out inst. vars 0.325 -0.004 0.184 
(2) 2SLS – IV w/ inst. vars 0.448 0.20917% 0.378 
(3) HP – OLS w/ inst. vars 0.095 0.103 0.178 
(4) HP – FE 0.485 0.306 0.180 
(5) HP – GLS w/out inst. vars 0.375 0.099 0.129 
(6) HP – GLS w/ inst. vars 0.326 0.166 0.229 
NOTES: Bold figures denotes significant at the 10% level. 
(1) “2SLS – IV w/out inst. vars” refers to the 2SLS model applied to the five-year panel data, instrumented 
with the instrumental variables of the dummy for the left-wing government (LEFT) from the World Bank’s 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI 2004); political constraint (democracy) index (POLCONV) from 
Henisz (2000); military spending as a ratio to GDP (MILEXP) from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI); yearly changes in unemployment rates (D_U); and regional dummies, but does 
not include “institutional variables” mentioned in the text.  (2) “2SLS – IV w/ inst. vars” is a five-year 
panel model instrumented with the same IVs, but it includes the institutional variables.  (3) “HP – OLS w/ 
inst. vars” refers to the OLS model applied to a set of RHS variables that include variables detrended with 
HP-filter.  (4) “HP – FE” refers to the fixed effects  model applied to a set of RHS variables that include 
variables annual HP-filtered data, but not institutional and interaction terms. (5) “HP – GLS w/out inst. vars” 
refers to the GLS model applied to a set of RHS variables that include HP-filtered variables, but no 
institutional variables and interaction terms. (6) “HP – GLS w/ inst. vars” refers to the GLS model applied to 
a set of RHS variables that include HP-filtered variables, institutional variables, and their interaction terms. 
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Figure 1: U.S. current account balance and real interest rate, 1979 – 2006 
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Figure 2: National Saving, Investment and Current Account Balances 
 
Figure 3: Effects of a 10% Change in Financial Development (PCGDP) 
on Current Accounts, Saving, and Investment in Emerging Asia 
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Figure 4: Implied Current Accounts
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Figure 5: Out-of-sample Predictions of Current Accounts with and without Institutional Variables, Industrialized Countries
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Figure 6: Prediction Errors from the Estimations  
with and without Institutional Variables for the 2001-04 Period (PPT) 
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Figure 7-1: Out-of-sample predictions  
for U.S. national saving and investment  
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Figure 7-2: Out-of-sample predictions for Emerging Asia’s 
national saving and investment (excluding China) 
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